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Abstract
This study investigates the empirical relationships between macroeconomic instability,
capital accumulation and growth in Turkey over the period 1963-1999. We use recent time
series econometric techniques, such as cointegration and impulse response analysis, to
analyze empirical relationships between the variables of interest.  The results of this paper
suggest that the chronic and increasing macroeconomic instability of the Turkish economy
has seriously affected her capital formation and hence her growth. Furthermore, chronic
macroeconomic instability seems to become a serious impediment to the public investment,
especially, its infrastructure component, and shattered or, even reversed the complementarity
between public and private investment in the long-run. Therefore, Turkish experience has
shown that macroeconomic instability not only deteriorates economic growth but it could
also reverse the complementarity between public and private investment in the long-run.
Key Words: Public Investment, Private Investment, Complementarity, Macroeconomic
Instability
JEL Classification: E62, E63, C523
1.  INTRODUCTION
During 1980s and early 1990s, many developing countries
1 followed unstable
macroeconomic policies, and they tend to exhibit excessive budget deficits, high and chronic
inflation rate, low and volatile economic growth rates over an extended period of time.
Similarly, during the same period there has been a remarkable decline in public capital
spending (as a share of output) in many developing and developed countries. Many
economists nowadays believe that macroeconomic instability
2 is detrimental to capital
accumulation and economic growth, and there are significant empirical evidence that support
this view (e.g. Kormendi and Meguire, 1985; Fischer, 1993a, 1993b; Briault, 1995; and
Bleaney, 1996).
3  Other empirical studies found positive effects of public capital spending,
particularly infrastructure spending, on private investment, productivity and growth (see, for
example, Sturm et al. 1998; Pereira, 2000; and Mittnik and Neumann, 2001). These studies
suggest that a decrease in public capital spending could be harmful for economic growth.
Furthermore, recently new political economy literature has emphasized the role of political
factors on macroeconomic instability
4 and the decline in public capital spending relative to
current spending, particularly in the case of fiscal stringency. It is argued that political
instability and polarization (e.g. politically weak, populist and myopic governments), and
strategic behavior of policy makers or the interactions among them (e.g. strategic use of debt
policy, delayed stabilizations), may have harmful effects on macroeconomic stability, public
investment and economic growth for long period of time (See, Persson and Tabellini, 2000
and Drazen, 2000 for an overview).
Currently there are two related strands of research on the role of public capital spending in
capital accumulation and economic growth. The first one focuses on the public (capital)
spending and private investment nexus. In this research area, many studies found significant
                                                          
1Some developed countries also ran large budget deficits during this period.
2We define macroeconomic instability in line with Fischer (1993a,1993b) and Bleaney (1996);
therefore, when we talk about a rise in macroeconomic instability we mean a rise in one or more policy-
induced macroeconomic instability indicators, such as inflation rate,  deficit to GNP ratio and external
debt to GNP ratio.
3Furthermore, World Bank (1993) argued that stable and sensible macroeconomic policies had
promoted economic growth in the East Asian Countries. Similarly, recent empirical study by Sanchez-
Robles (1998) concluded that macroeconomic stability should be regarded as a prerequisite for
economic growth in the Spanish economy. Moreover, Cardosa (1993) found some evidence of negative
effect of economic instability on private investment in Latin America.
4Developing countries may also experience macroeconomic instability as a result of (mis)-management
of overall economy (e.g. by pursuing wrong policy mix), structural characteristics such as income and4
complementarity (crowding-in) effect, but some studies found inconclusive or contradictory
results (see, for example, Blejer and Khan, 1984; Taylor, 1991; Argimon et al., 1997;
Cardosa, 1993; and Aschauer, 1989b). Blejer and Khan (1984) among others suggest that this
ambiguity might be the result of using aggregate rather than disaggregate public investment,
e.g. infrastructure public investment. Similarly evidence for the Turkish economy is also
ambiguous (see, for example, Anand et al., 1990; Celasun and Tansel, 1993; Conway, 1990;
Metin-Ozcan et al, 2001; and Uygur, 1995). Second approach analyzes the public capital
spending and output (or growth) nexus. In this approach, the role of public capital spending,
especially, public infrastructure investment, has been theoretically considered both in a
production function framework (e.g. Aschauer, 1989a) and in a new growth theory
framework (e.g. Barro, 1990). Most of the empirical studies conducted in this area, either
using a single-equation time series (e.g. Aschauer, 1989a) or a cross-section analysis (e.g.,
Easterly and Rebelo, 1993) has indicated a positive effect of public investment on growth.
Early studies on these two literatures were criticized both on empirical and theoretical
grounds. For example, on theoretical grounds, production function approach is criticized for
being inappropriate for analyzing the long run effects of public capital  spending (see,
Mittnik and Neumann, 2001 and the references therein). The main empirical criticisms are
related to the reverse-causation, simultaneity, and “spuriousness” of the results (Munnel,
1992, Pereira, 2000 and Sturm et al., 1998). To overcome these empirical problems, very
recent studies used new time series techniques,
5 such as multivariate cointegration and
impulse response analyses (e.g., Ghali, 1998; Pereira, 2000; and Mittnik and Neumann,
2001).
6 These studies have used variables such as private investment, public investment and
output to analyze the effects of public capital spending on private capital spending and
output; however, the issue of macroeconomic instability has not been analyzed yet. In this
study our aim is to extend the recent literature by considering a developing country like
Turkey, which we believe is a good case study since she has suffered (and is still suffering)
from chronic macroeconomic instability over the last twenty five years. To accomplish this
we estimate the long-run relationship between public investment, private investment,
macroeconomic instability and output in Turkey for the period 1963-1999 by using
multivariate cointegration analysis. Furthermore, we also provide the generalized impulse
                                                                                                                                                                     
wealth inequality (See, for example, Dornbusch and Edwards (1990) and Onis (1997)), and/or
vulnerability to external shocks.
5Recently, some researchers pointed out the importance of time series techniques in growth studies,
mainly due to the methodological problems with cross-section studies. See, for example, Temple (1999)
and Ericsson et al. (2001) and the references cited there.
6There are also single-equation time series studies, e.g., Nazmi and Ramirez (1997) and Ramirez (1998)
but these studies do not address most of the empirical problems cited in the text.5
response functions to examine the dynamic effects of a shock on a given variable on all the
other variables in the system. Moreover, the empirical analysis is extended by considering the
infrastructure component of the public investment.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a condensed overview of the Turkish
economy over the sample period (1963-99). Empirical results appear in Section 3 and finally
Section 4 gives the conclusion and the policy implications of the findings.
2. AN OVERVIEW OF THE TURKISH ECONOMY, 1963-99
In this section, we will provide a condensed overview of the Turkish economy for the 1963-
99 period. In line with the aim of this paper, we will mainly focus on capital formation,
growth and macroeconomic instability.
7
Table 1 provides summary information on the Turkish economy for the overall (1963-99) and
two sub-periods, namely, inward-oriented period (1963-1979) and outward-oriented period
(1980-1999). During 1963-1979 period, Turkey followed a state-led inward-oriented growth
strategy by following import substitution policies and economy-wide planning by the State
Planning Organization (SPO). Besides the trade restrictions and financial repression policies
(e.g. regulated interest rates), the state made use of a heavy public investment, especially in
the manufacturing sector, to promote industrialization and economic development. During the
inward-oriented period, Turkey enjoyed a quite high rate of growth (real GNP grew at annual
average rate of 5.1%) and a rapid rate of capital accumulation.
8 While real private
investment
9 increased at an average annual rate of 7%, public investment increased at an
average annual rate of 9.7% from 1963 to 1979.
                                                          
7See, for example, Aricanli and Rodrik, 1990; Boratav et al, 1996; Celasun, 1994; Celasun and Rodrik,
1989;  Ekinci, 1990, 2000; Metin-Ozcan et al., 2001; Metin, 1998; Ozatay, 1997, 2000; and Senses,
1990, 1991 and references therein for more detailed analysis on related and other issues.
8It would be more appropriate to analyze inward-oriented period by considering two sub-periods,
namely, economic crisis period (1978-79) and pre-crisis period (1963-77). The economic growth rate is
more impressive when we look at the pre-crisis period (1963-1977) (real GNP grew at an annual
average rate of 5.8%). Investment performance was also better for the pre-crisis period (1963-77), real
private (public) investment grew, on average, by 9.3% (12.2%) per year.6
Table 1. Selected Indicators of the Turkish Economy
1963-99  1963-79  1980-99
I. Output and Capital Formation
 I.A Annual Average Growth Rate
   Real GNP (Y) 4.4 5.1 4.2
   Real Private Fixed Investment (IP) 5.8 7.0 6.1
   Real Public Fixed Investment  (IG) 5.0 9.7 1.6
   Real Public Fixed Core Infrastructure  Investment (IGI) 5.9 10.8 2.7
   Real Public Fixed Non-Core Infrastructure  Investment 4.3 26.5 0.8
 I.B Composition of Public Investment*
   Core Infrastructural Investment (as % of total) 44.4 37.3 50.5
   Non-Core Infrastructure Investment (as % of total) 55.6 62.7 49.5
II.  Macroeconomic Instability*
    Macroeconomic Instability Index (MII) 0.326 0.104 0.514
    Inflation Rate (INF),** % 41.7 18.1 61.8
*  Simple period average.
**  INF=Percentage change in GNP Deflator.
Source: See the data appendix
During the 1960s the macroeconomic environment was quite stable.
10 However, mainly due
to foreign exchange difficulties of the late 1960s, in 1970 Turkey introduced an IMF-based
stabilization package, which involved a maxi devaluation.
11 From 1973 to 1977, Turkey
experienced an unprecedented growth in investment, led by public sector investment, mainly
in manufacturing and transportation. Both public and private investment grew at an
unprecedented rate, 20.4% and 8.4%, respectively, during this period. However,
macroeconomic instability significantly increased during mid-70s mainly due to the
deterioration of the fiscal balances and the excessive reliance on foreign borrowing. By late
1970s Turkey reached a state where it could no longer service even the short-term debts and
hence entered severe economic crisis.
12
                                                                                                                                                                     
9It should be noted that investment series have been revised several times in Turkey during last two
decades (See, for example, Conway (1990)). We reported our results in this section and elsewhere
based upon the most recent series of the SPO (See data appendix for more detail)
10During 1960s average inflation rate (INF) was 5.2%, and it was lowest compared to the 1970s  (27%),
1980s (50.4%) and 1990s (73.2%). Furthermore, macroeconomic instability index (MII) was 0.04
points and it was the lowest decade average compared to other decades.
11See Celasun (1994) and Krueger (1974 ).
12See Celasun and Rodrik (1989).7
In 1980, Turkey took a crucial decision to switch its overall economic strategy from inward-
oriented growth strategy to outward-oriented growth strategy.
13 The 1980 program had both
stabilization and structural aspects (e.g. trade and financial liberalization), and was strongly
backed by IMF, World Bank and OECD consortium. The role of state had crucially changed
with this program; for example, in line with the new strategy, the state changed its investment
strategy from manufacturing to infrastructure.
14
During outward-oriented period, real GNP of the Turkish economy grew at an average annual
rate of 4.2%. Compared to the inward-oriented period, this performance doesn’t seem
impressive.
15 However, in the outward-oriented period, economic growth rate was much
better during 1980s (5.2% per year) compared to 1990s (3.2% per year).
16  Relatively
speaking, the performance of capital formation in private sector was better compared to that
of public sector during this period. Real private (public) investment grew at an average
annual rate of 6.1% (1.6%), from 1980 to 1999.
17 As we mentioned before, the crucial change
in this period is the changing role of the state in the investment process. The share of core
public infrastructure (transport + communication + energy) investment in total public
investment rose from 37.3% in the inward-oriented period to 50.5% in the outward-oriented
period. Nevertheless, while private investment-GNP ratio (in current prices) rose from 12.8%
in 1980s to 18.1% in 1990s, public investment-GNP ratio dropped from 8.8% in 1980s to
6.2% in 1990s. The main reason behind this fall is the rising macroeconomic instability after
late 1980s, which has seriously lowered the fiscal “ability” of governments for making
necessary investments (especially, infrastructure investments).
18
Generally speaking, macroeconomic instability has steadily increased since mid-1970s and
since then has become a chronic problem for the Turkish economy.
19 During early 1980s
Turkey was successful in lowering the macroeconomic instability inherited from the
                                                          
13See, for example, Aricanli and Rodrik (1990), Boratav et al. (1996), Celasun (1994), and Senses
(1991).
14See Aricanli and Rodrik (1990), Boratav et al. (1996) ,Celasun (1994), Celasun and Rodrik (1989),
Ekinci (1990,2000), Metin-Ozcan et al. (2001) and Senses (1991) for an assessment of the 1980
program and Turkey’s post-1980 adjustment.
15Furthermore, real GNP fluctuated less during inward-oriented period compared to outward-oriented
period.
16Moreover, volatility (variability) of real GNP has increased during 1990s.
17Note that as with real GNP, volatility of both public and private investment has increased during
1990s.
18In line with this argument, Conway (1990:82) stated that “[r]eal public investment growth appears to
have [negatively] responded to budgetary pressures.”
19Average annual inflation rate (INF) rose from 5.2%  in 1960s to 27% in 1970s, 50.4% in 1980s and
73.2% in 1990s. Similarly macroeconomic instability index (MII) rose from 0.04 points in 1960s, to
0.149 points in 1970s, 0.436 points in 1980s and 0.591 points in 1990s.8
economic crisis of late 1970s, inflation rate and MII fell from 89.6% and 0.520 points in 1980
to 26% and 0.317 points in 1983, respectively. Similarly, macroeconomic management was
quite good during mid-1980s. However, starting from late 1980s macroeconomic instability
has risen, mainly due to political factors and related populist and myopic policies,
20 and
associated problems of public sector imbalances. Before late 1993, Turkey had managed to
maintain the populist policies mainly with the help of capital inflows.
21 However, the cost of
this strategy was very high, real interest rate on domestic debt had increased steadily during
early 1990s and this deteriorated the fiscal balances,
22 for instance, domestic interest
payments out of consolidated budget (as % of GNP) almost doubled from 1990 to 1993.
Turkey experienced a very severe financial crisis in early 1994 mainly due to unsustainable
fiscal balances, the collapse of the domestic debt market, monetization and the expectations
of further monetization.
23 Real GNP contracted by 6.1% from 1993 to 1994, which is the
peak rate of contraction of the Turkish economy over the 1963-1999 period. Similarly, real
public investment fell dramatically by about 40%,
24 from 1993 to 1994. Real private
investment, however, contracted only moderately (about 5%). Both inflation and MII had
peaked in 1994, inflation rate was 107.3% and MII was 0.842 points in 1994. Furthermore,
Turkish Lira depreciated by more than 150% against US$ in 1994. In mid-1994, Turkey
adopted an IMF-based stand-by agreement, and managed to cool-down the severe economic
crisis, inflation rate and MII fell from 107.3% and 0.842 points in 1994 to 87.2% and 0.563
points in 1995, respectively. However, macroeconomic instability has continued until late
1990s, mainly due to reluctance of governments (e.g. to avoid negative political
consequences) to take necessary painful measures; in other words, governments delayed
stabilization.
25 During this period, public sector balances were unsustainable due to reliance
on the domestic borrowing (e.g. real interest rate on domestic debt almost doubled from 1994
to 1999).  In December 1999, Turkey signed a three-year IMF-based stand-by agreement,
which mainly aimed to solve the public sector imbalances.
26 Unfortunately, this program had
                                                          
20See, for example, Ozatay (1999), Akyurek (1999) and Onis (1997) for more detail and empirical
evidence.
21Turkish Lira became fully convertible and capital account was fully-liberalized  in 1989.
22See Ekinci (2000) for more detail.
23See, for example, Celasun (1998), Ekinci (2000), Ozatay (1997, 2000) and Yeldan (1997) and the
references therein for an overview and sources of the 1994 crisis.
24This is a solid evidence of the negative effect of macroeconomic instability on fiscal “ability” of
governments for making investment.
25See, for example, Veiga (2000) for well documented reasons for delayed stabilizations.
26See Ekinci (2000) and the references therein for a thorough overview of these problems and extensive
assessment of the aspects of this program.9
failed in early 2001 due to a major economic crisis and Turkey signed another program
backed by IMF and World Bank, which is still being implemented in Turkey.
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
3.1. The Data and Unit Root Tests
The data used in this study are Turkish annual data from 1963 to 1999. The sample period is
determined by the availability of official investment data. Figures 1-3 show the time plots of
(LNY), (LNIP, LNIG, LNIGI) and (LNMII) respectively, where LNY is the (natural)
logarithm of real GNP, LNIP is the logarithm of real private fixed investment,  LNIG is the
logarithm of real public fixed investment, LNIGI is the logarithm of real public fixed core
infrastructure investment and LNMII is the logarithm of macroeconomic instability index
(MII). Data appendix provides the detail on the definitions and the sources of the data.
A visual inspection of the data suggests that all these series are I(1) (i.e. integrated of order
one) or they have a unit root(s). However, we also provide the formal unit root test results in
Table 2. As expected, for all variables investigated none of them rejects the null hypothesis
of I(1) at 95% critical level (See, the ADF test results in the second and third columns of
Table 2). Furthermore, the null hypothesis of I(2) or existence of two unit roots rejected at
95% critical level for all variables (See, the ADF Test results on first differences in the fourth
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column of Table 2).
27 Therefore, all these evidence suggest that the variables under
consideration can be considered as I(1). However, it is well-documented that if we neglect
level and/or trend shift (e.g. due to structural break) in unit root tests, such as the ADF test,
we could possibly give “spurious” unit root result (See, for example, Perron, 1989; and
Franses, 1998; and the references therein). Therefore, since we know the break date quite
well from the evidence reported in Section 2, which is 1980, we also performed a Perron test,
which allows for a change in the level and trend. All variables except LNIG cannot reject the
null hypothesis of a unit root at 95% critical level (See, the Perron Test results on first
                                                          
27Furthermore, the time plots of the first differences of all the variables (not reported in the paper but
they can be requested from the first author) support these results.11
differences in the last column of Table 2). However, LNIG cannot reject the null at 99%
critical level.
In sum, all these results lend support to the maintained assumption that all these variables are
I(1), which is a pre-condition for a cointegration analysis.
Table 2. Unit Root Tests
Variables ADF Test Perron Test




a    Model
f
LNY -1.0696 (0)
c -2.4769 (0) -4.9665 (0)*
d -2.6439(0)
h
LNIP -1.2921 (1) -3.0168 (3) -3.3808 (0)* -2.0148(1)
LNIG -2.2886 (3) -2.4310 (1) -4.5756 (0)* -4.4852(2)
g
LNIGI -1.9448 (0) -1.8378 (0) -4.4798 (1)* -3.8352(1)
LNMII -1.2578 (1) -----
 e -8.0355 (0)* -----
 e
aADF regressions include an intercept but not a linear trend (See, Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997:53).
bADF regressions include both an intercept and a linear trend (See, Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997:53).
cNumbers in parentheses are the order of augmentations (p*) chosen by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Note that unit
root test results also hold when p*(s) are chosen by Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC). Due to a size-power trade-off in the
determination of the order of augmentation (p) of ADF tests, we choose to select p* by AIC, which is a common practice in the
applied works (see, Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997:213). Therefore, in line with Pesaran and Pesaran (1997:213), first we estimated
ADF regressions for p=0 to p=4 and selected the order of augmentation (p*) based on AIC. Then, we performed the ADF tests
(see the text). Note that the same sample period (1969-1999) is used in calculations.
dAn asterisk (*) represents the rejection of the unit root null hypothesis at 95% critical level (MacKinnon, 1991:Table 1)
e Since MII is bounded between 0 and 1 due to its construction (see the data appendix), we did not include trend for LNMII (see,
for example, Ahmet and Rogers (2000)). Furthermore, linear trend in LNMII is not meaningful from the economic point of view.
fThis model is within innovation outlier (IO) framework and allows for both a change in the level and trend (See, Franses
(1998:150-1) for this test).
gLNIG rejects the null hypothesis at 95% critical level but not at 99% level (see Franses (1998, Table 6.6) for critical values).
hNumbers in parentheses are the order of augmentations (p*) chosen by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Note that test
results also hold when p*(s) are chosen by Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) or if we just use the same p*(s) of the third
column. We use the same procedure as in note (c) for determining the order of augmentation (p*). Note that the same sample
period (1969-1999) is used in calculations.
3.2. System Cointegration Analysis
This sub-section provides the system cointegration results. We provide results for total public
investment and its infrastructure components. In line with this, we form two cointegration
systems: System #1 [LNIP, LNY, LNIG, LNMII] and System #2 [LNIP, LNY, LNIGI,
LNMII].
We use Johansen multivariate technique in our cointegration analyses (see Johansen, 1988
and Johansen, 1995). Following Doornik et al. (1998), Hendry and Juselius (2001) and
Pesaran and Smith (1998), first we performed a cointegration analysis with constant term
entering unrestrictively but the trend term is restricted to lie in the cointegration space.12
However, trend term was found to be insignificant in the cointegration relation(s);
28 hence,
following Hendry and Juselius (2001) we performed a cointegration analysis with constant
term entering unrestrictively but with no linear trends.
Following Juselius (2001) and Juselius and MacDonald (2000), we also include a step
(intervention) dummy (DS80) in each cointegration system to account for the structural break
of 1980. DS80 entered restrictively to the cointegration space. However, this step dummy is
found to be insignificant in the cointegration relation.
29 This might be due to the reason that
1980 structural break could have affected several variables similarly
30 and hence causing the
intervention effects to cancel out (see, Hendry and Juselius, 2001). Therefore, we did not
include DS80 in our cointegration analysis.
Below, we present the cointegration analysis for the System #1 and System #2.
SYSTEM #1 [LNIP, LNY, LNIG, LNMII]
First we form system with the variables [LNIP, LNY, LNIG, LNMII] and test for
cointegration. Table 3 provides the cointegration result for System #1 with the lag length of
the VAR = 1.
31 We also included an impulse dummy for 1994 (D94) unrestrictively in our
cointegration analysis.
32 The trace and max statistics suggest one cointegration relation.
33
When we investigate Table 3, this cointegration relation seems to be the following simple
long-run private investment relation:
34
                                                          
28Underlying trends of the variables under consideration possibly cancelled out in the cointegration
relation (see Hendry and Juselius (2001)).
29Similarly, we also include a step dummy (DS89) in each cointegration system to account for the effect
of the full-financial liberalization  in 1989. This step dummy is also found to be insignificant in the
cointegration relation.
30As can be seen from Figures 1-3, there is some visual evidence on this.
31Note that the lag length of the VAR for each system is determined by Schwarz Bayesian Criterion
(SBC).
32When we examine the regression results for each equation in VAR(1) model, LNIG equation has non-
normal residuals. This is clearly evident in the residual plot of that equation in which 1994 is an
outlying observation. (Note that this is consistent with the evidence in Section 2). Therefore, following
Hendry and Juselius (2001), we include impulse dummy for 1994 (D94) in our cointegration analysis
for System #1. After including D94 in VAR(1) unrestrictively, all equations have normal distributions
and none of them show autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (see Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997 for the
details of these tests). Due to the same considerations we also include impulse dummy for 1994 (D94)
in our cointegration analysis for System #2.
33It should be noted here that the trace and max statistics for System #1 without the impulse dummy
(D94) also suggests one cointegration relation. Therefore, our results are not an artefact of dummy
(D94).
34Note that we call this investment relation as simple investment relation since other determinants of
investment, e.g. real interest rate, are absent in equation (1) (and the System #1) due to the purpose of13
LNIP = 3.24 LNY – 4.67 LNMII – 0.29 LNIG          (1)
This equation suggests that private investment is positively affected by output, negatively
affected by macroeconomic instability and public investment for the period under study.
These results are consistent with theory and the descriptive analysis of the Turkish economy
provided in Section 2.
Table 3. Cointegration Analysis of System #1
Eigenvalues 0.60355 0.21840 0.12638 0.03471
























              LNIP                  LNY               LNMII               LNIG
 (ββββ ’)
b           1                    -3.2364              4.6669                0.289
                                        (0.48324)
c          (1.2104)           (0.18182)
 (αααα ’)
d      -0.0919               0.0161              -0.1449               -0.0280
Hypotheses Tests                                                             ΧΧΧΧ
2(u)                          u                         p-value
Test of  significance
e of LNY                                            17.3                            1                           0.00
Test of significance of LNMII                                           24.3                            1                           0.00
Test of significance of LNIG                                             2.2                              1                           0.14
aCritical values are from Osterwald-Lenum (1992, Table 1)
bStandardized eigenvector.
cAsymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
dAdjustment coefficients.
eTest  of long-run exclusion (See, Hendry and Juselius, 2001).
                                                                                                                                                                     
the study, or data availability and/or limitations of  cointegrated VAR analysis with relatively small
sample size (see Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997 for more detail).14
As it can be seen from standard errors of the cointegration vector in Table 3, all variables
except LNIG are statistically significant. We also formally tested the significance of the
variables by exclusion test. The results of these tests are confirmatory (Table 3). That is,
LNY and LNMII have significant coefficients, but LNIG has insignificant coefficient.
However, if we consider the cointegration result for System #1 without D94, we will have the
following simple long-run private investment relation:
LNIP = 3.44 LNY – 5 LNMII – 0.38 LNIG                                                       (2)
Both equations ((1) and (2)) are quite similar but when we examine standard errors (not
reported) all variables seem to be significant. The result of significance (exclusion) test
provides a p-value of 0.059 for LNIG (LNY and LNMII both have p-value=0); therefore,
there is some (but marginal)
35 evidence of long-run crowding-out effect.
SYSTEM #2 [LNIP, LNY, LNIGI, LNMII]
We now would like to examine the effect of infrastructure component of the public
investment. Therefore, only difference of System #2 compared with the System #1 is that we
have replaced LNIG with LNIGI. Table 4 provides the cointegration results for the System #2
with lag length of VAR = 1.
36 The evidence favors one cointegration relation and it is also
interpreted as private investment relation (See Table 4). The crucially different result in this
system is that even though LNIGI has negative effect (crowding-out) on LNIP, its coefficient
is not significant as indicated by the long-run exclusion test in Table 4. Furthermore, this is
also the case without D94.
37 After imposing the long-run exclusion restriction (and the
normalization restriction), the investment relation becomes:
LNIP = 3.15LNY – 5.20 LNMII                                                                         (4)
This simple investment equation suggests that private investment is positively affected by
output and negatively affected by macroeconomic instability.  Again, these results are
                                                          
35At 5.9% significance level.
36Due to the similar considerations D94 enters unrestrictively to cointegration analysis.
37Note that, in System #2  without D94, the private investment relation becomes: LNIP = 3.21 LNY –
0.23 LNIGI – 4.45 LNMII. Furthermore, all variables are significant except LNIGI (p-value = 0.11).15
consistent with theory and the descriptive analysis of the Turkish economy provided in
Section 2.
Table 4. Cointegration Analysis of System #2
Eigenvalues 0.638 0.17509 0.10778 0.042736
























          LNIP                LNY               LNMII              LNIGI
(ββββ ’)
b       1                 -3.1551             4.3892              0.20909
                                (0.39148)
c        (1.0593)           (0.12639)
(αααα ’)
d  -0.0905            0.0185            -0.1499            -0.1393
Hypotheses Tests                                                             ΧΧΧΧ
2(u)                          u                         p-value
Test of significance
e of LNY                                             17.7                            1                           0.00
Test of significance of LNMII                                           29.5                            1                           0.00
Test of significance of LNIGI                                              2                               1                           0.16
Restricted Cointegration Analysis
          LNIP                  LNY                LNMII
(ββββ ’)
b       1                    -3.1539               5.2016
                                   (0.50615)
c           (1.4605)
(αααα ’)
d  -0.0548               0.0198                -0.1290
aCritical values are from Osterwald-Lenum (1992, Table 1)
bStandardized eigenvector.
cAsymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
dAdjustment coefficients.
eTest of long-run exclusion (See, Hendry and Juselius, 2001).
Finally, we would like to note that our main results in this section also hold when we use
inflation rate as a proxy
38 for macroeconomic instability. This is provided in Ismihan (2002).
In the next section, in order to get more insights, we examine the dynamic effects of a shock
on a given variable on all the other variables in the system, by using impulse response
                                                          
38According to Fischer (1993b:487), inflation rate is the best single indicator [of  policy-induced
macroeconomic instability] and “serve as an overall ability of government to manage the economy”.16
analysis. (See, for instance, Lutkepohl and Reimers (1992) and Pesaran and Pesaran (1997)
for the importance of impulse response analysis in cointegrated systems).
3.3. Impulse Response Analysis
In this section, we provide the generalized impulse response (IR) functions
39 to examine the
dynamic effects, that is, short and medium-run effects of a shock on a given variable on all
the other variables in the system. Below, we present this analysis for the System #1 only
since the impulse response analysis of System #2 is quite similar to that of System #1.
40
Firstly, in order to assess the dynamic effects of macroeconomic instability on other variables
in the system, we examine the generalized IRs to a positive unit [one standard error (S.E.)]
shock in macroeconomic instability (LNMII) equation provided in panel (a) Figure 4. As
expected, short and medium-run responses are negative. That is, private investment, public
investment and output are negatively and permanently affected by a positive shock in
macroeconomic instability. However, private investment was dramatically affected compared
to output, which is the least affected one. Furthermore, public investment is also seriously
affected from macroeconomic instability shock. This might be due to a negative effect of
macroeconomic instability shock on the fiscal “ability” of governments. That is, an increase
in macroeconomic instability could negatively affect public investment by reducing the fiscal
“ability” of government(s) and hence increasing the level of fiscal stringency. Therefore,
governments tend to cut public investment rather than current or populist spending in the case
of fiscal stringency, as suggested by the recent new political economy literature. All these
results are consistent with our analysis in Section 2. Finally, as can be seen from panel (a) of
Figure 4, impact effects of macroeconomic instability shock on both private and public
effects are smaller compared to the medium-term effects; that is, the effect of a
macroeconomic instability shock has an accelerating negative effect on investment,
especially, on private investment.
                                                          
39We prefer to use generalized IR functions since, unlike to the orthogonalized IR functions,
generalized IR functions do not depend on the ordering of the variables within the system (Pesaran and
Shin, 1998).
40There is only one considerable difference. In the System #2, public infrastructure investment is more
seriously affected from macroeconomic instability (shock) compared to total public investment in
System #1. This is consistent with the observation that Turkey failed to make necessary infrastructure
investment due to fiscal problems and restraints during late 1990s, and hence experienced infrastructure
bottlenecks, such as energy bottlenecks, during late 1990s and early 2000s.  The results of generalized
IR analysis for the System #2 can be requested from the first author.17
Secondly, we examine the dynamic effects of public investment shock on other variables in
the cointegration system. As can be seen from the panel (b) of Figure 4, responses of private
investment and output are positive; however, the response of the former is much higher.
These results suggest a complementarity between public and private investment in short and
medium-run. Note that, public and private investment moved (“wandered”) together,







































































(c)  Generalized IR(s) to one S.E. shock in the equation for LNY
implying complementarity, until late 1970s (see Figure 2) but after late 1970s this
relationship started to shatter possibly due to a negative effect of chronic macroeconomic
instability on both private and public investment but via different channels.
41 Furthermore,
this relationship seems to be reversed after late 1980s, possibly due to rising macroeconomic
instability and associated deterioration in fiscal balances, which has affected both public and
private investment. Therefore, in the case of Turkey, chronic and increasing macroeconomic
instability and associated fiscal problems seems to shatter or even reverse the
complementarity between public and private investment in the long-run. This observation is
in line with the recent work by Metin-Ozcan et al. (2001).
42
Furthermore, response of macroeconomic instability to public investment shock is initially
negative but over the medium-term it diminishes towards zero. This result suggest that rise in
public investment does not contribute to macroeconomic instability over the short and
medium term. This result seems to be counterintuitive. However, one potential explanation
for this seemingly counterintuitive result is that an increase in public investment in case of
chronic macroeconomic instability and associated fiscal stringency signals a decisive change
in fiscal policy, e.g. from populist to productive spending, and could have immediate political
credibility and expectation effects which will lower expected inflation, inflation risk on
                                                          
41By creating uncertainty about current and future macroeconomic environment, the chronic and
increasing macroeconomic instability could affect investment and production decisions of the private
firms (e.g. Fischer, 1993a and 1993b).  Furthermore, rising fiscal deficits could possibly crowd-out
financial resources available for new private investment. For example, Celasun (1994) pointed out these
possibilities, among others, in his analysis on the unsatisfactory investment performance of Turkish
manufacturing sector. As we mentioned above, the chronic and increasing macroeconomic instability
could also negatively affect public investment by reducing the fiscal “ability” of government(s) and
hence increasing the level of fiscal stringency.19
borrowing, and hence macroeconomic instability (See, for example, Alesina et al. (1998) and
Perotti (1999) and the references therein for similar arguments).
43   Furthermore, the rise in
public investment increases expenditures of government but the rise in public investment also
increases national income and output due to its dual role; that is, public (and also private)
investment affects both demand and supply-side of the economy. The rise in national income
will, in turn, increase the revenues of government, e.g. tax and seigniorage revenue, and help
to reduce fiscal deficit and, therefore, inflation over some period, but with diminishing
effects.
Thirdly, we would like to examine the dynamic effects of a positive unit shock to output on
all the other variables. As panel (c) of Figure 4 reveals, short and medium-run responses of
private investment to a rise in output is positive as expected. Similarly, the response of public
investment is also positive. Furthermore, as can be seen from panel (c) of Figure 4, impact
effects of output shock on both private and public investment are only slightly different than
medium-term effects. Moreover, short-run responses of macroeconomic instability is negative
(e.g. due to the positive effect on revenues of government and, therefore, inflation); however
over the medium term this response approaches towards zero.
44
In the next section, we provide conclusion and the policy implications.
4. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This study has investigated the empirical relationships between macroeconomic instability,
capital accumulation and growth in Turkey over the period 1963-1999.
The main conclusion from our study is that the chronic macroeconomic instability of the
Turkish economy has seriously affected capital formation and growth of the Turkish
economy. Even though we found some evidence of crowding-out effect of total public
investment on private investment, there was no significant effect of public infrastructure
investment on private investment in the long-run. However, we found some evidence of
complementarity between private and public investment over the short and medium-run. Our
                                                                                                                                                                     
42Conway (1990) pointed to the negative effects of price-based structural adjustment policies on private
investment in Turkey.
43According to Perotti (1999:1400), “… in times of fiscal stress the economy’s response to fiscal shocks
changes qualitatively.”
44The dynamic effects of private investment shock are similar to public investment shock on all the
other variables (simply replace LNIP with LNIG in panel (b) of Figure 4); therefore, it is not separately
explained.20
results suggest that the chronic macroeconomic instability seems to become a serious
impediment to the public investment, and has shattered, or even reversed, the long-run
complementarity. This result may also shed some light on the ambiguity concerning the
empirical evidence on  complementarity (crowding-in) effect for the Turkish economy.
The policy implications are straightforward when we consider these results. Generally
speaking, over the last twenty five years, governments in Turkey either delayed or did not
continue stabilization programs. The barriers to stabilization, such as political instability and
polarization, are well-documented in Veiga (2000) and Drazen (2000) among others.
Nevertheless, as this study shows, macroeconomic instability has an adverse impact on
capital accumulation and economic growth in Turkey. Therefore, the government should
continue the current stabilization program to restore macroeconomic stability, as soon as
possible. This is the first policy implication.
The second policy implication is that policy makers have to be careful in their decisions
concerning the components of public spending that would bear the burden of fiscal
adjustment. If government reduces public capital spending (especially, infrastructure
spending) instead of current and populist spending; then, this would harm capital
accumulation, economic growth and development.
45 Furthermore, as opposed to the
conventional view that fiscal adjustments are recessionary, there is growing evidence that
some types of fiscal adjustments may be expansionary (e.g. Perotti, 1996, 1999; and Alesina
et al.,1998). In other words, this new line of research argues that composition of adjustment
matters. For example, fiscal adjustments based on current spending may be expansionary
under certain conditions, e.g. initial conditions like very high level of debt to GNP ratio (See,
Perotti, 1999).
In sum, Turkish experience has shown that macroeconomic instability not only deteriorates
economic growth but it may also reverse the complementarity between public and private
investment in the long-run. In order to shed further light on this result, this study can be
further extended for other developing countries suffering from chronic instability like Turkey
and this is left for further research.
                                                          
45See, for example, World Bank (1994) and the references therein, for the crucial importance and the
multi-dimensional roles of infrastructure in economic development.21
DATA APPENDIX
LNY is the (natural) logarithm of real GNP in 1994 prices (billion TL).
Source: SPO (1997) and SPO (2001).
LNIP is the (natural) logarithm of real private fixed investments in 1994 prices (billion TL).
Nominal private fixed investment series were deflated by private fixed investment deflator
series.
Source: SPO (1997) and SPO (2001). Note: deflators were provided by the SPO.
LNIG is the (natural) logarithm of real public fixed investments in 1994 prices (billion TL).
Nominal public fixed investment series were deflated by public fixed investment deflator
series.
Source: SPO (1997) and SPO (2001). Note: deflators were provided by the SPO.
LNIGI is the (natural) logarithm of real public fixed core infrastructure investments in 1994
prices (billion TL). Nominal sectoral public fixed investment series were deflated by relevant
sectoral public fixed investment deflator series. In line with Ekinci (1990) and Boratav et al.
(1996) we define core infrastructure investment as the total of the public energy,
transportation and communication sectors’ fixed investments. See World Bank (1994:2) for
broad definition of infrastructure.
Source: SPO (1997) and SPO (2001).  Note: Sectoral deflators were provided by the SPO.
LNMII is the (natural) logarithm of the macroeconomic instability index (MII), i.e., LNMII =
ln (1+MII). This index is calculated by using human development index (HDI)  methodology
and it is based on macroeconomic instability indicators, such as inflation rate,  deficit to GNP
ratio,  external debt to GNP ratio and change in exchange rate, identified by previous
researchers (e.g. Fischer, 1993a,1993b; and Bleaney, 1996). It is a simple average of the four
sub-indices obtained from these four variables. We use this index (MII) as a proxy for
macroeconomic instability.
Source:  Ismihan (2002).22
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